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1. Introduction 
 
The paper aims to examine the right of people conceived through artificial reproductive 
technologies (ART) involving a third party’s contribution to know their origins.  
The analysis begins with a general introduction to ART and considers their impact on family as a 
social construct (2). It then ponders the double dimension of the right considered, namely the 
right to know genetic origins, which appears especially relevant in the current post-genomics era 
(3), and the right to know biographic origins (4). The paper proceeds considering the legal 
foundations of this right under international law (5.1), envisaging - in view of the case-law of the 
European Court of human rights (ECtHR) - possible principles to be applied in balancing it with 
other competing interests (5.2). It finally explains that the conditio sine qua non for a full exercise 
of the right to know personal origins is the awareness of the means of conception, a responsibility 
which rests upon the recipient parents, with only a residual role for the State (6).  
 
2. ART and the use of technology to generate children (and families) 
 
Artificial reproductive technologies include a number of treatments involving in vitro handling of 
human gametes (eggs and sperm) and embryos to establish a pregnancy.  
Since the birth of the first baby resulting from in vitro fertilization (IVF) in 1978, these methods 
strongly and constantly improved: nowadays techniques such as gamete donation, surrogacy, 
embryo cryopreservation1 and embryo donation are common in many States around the world 
and many other improvements are here to come in the near future. Numbers reveal also that ART 
represents a growing business2, with an international dimension: many patients travel to other 
countries to undertake fertility treatments not available to them in their own state for a number 
of reasons, fueling the phenomenon of ‘reproductive tourism’3. 
 
Aiming at generating a child, ART have a key impact on family as a social construct, only partially 
similar to adoption. In fact, while adoption is a normative and social instrument to create a family, 
ART involve a technical intervention in what has been for centuries considered exclusively a 
natural process, as they permit the separation of procreation from sexual intercourse. As such, 
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ART not only allow, analogously to adoption, ‘the creation of families that otherwise would not 
exist’4, but they also offer ‘alternative routes to family life, creating biological linkages that 
adoption bypasses’5. Additionally, while adoption is mainly conceived at the benefit of parentless 
children, ART help adults to realize their aspiration of becoming parents6. More than adoption, 
thus, these techniques permit ‘a remarkable pluralism of family structures’7. Single parents, same-
sex couples and older women are now able to found a family with children genetically related to 
them.  
 
As WALDMAN states: ‘for  some,  the  explosion  of  ART-inspired  families  is  cause  for 
celebration; for others, it signals the subversion of important social values. But  regardless  of  
whether  one  embraces  or  reviles  the  trend,  the proliferation of non-traditional baby-making 
poses a multitude of questions’8. This paper aims at analysing one of these issues, namely the right 
of ART-conceived people to know their origins. This question is relevant in any case of ‘third-party 
reproduction’, that is when (at least part of) the genetic material is provided, or the gestation is 
carried out, by a person other that the parent(s) who will take care of the resulting baby. These 
methods include:  
a) heterologous fertilization, entailing sperm/egg donation or the so-called ‘spindle transfer’, 
a genetic manipulation technique consisting in the use of the future mother’s nuclear DNA 
and the mitochondrial DNA coming from a donor9;  
b) embryo donation, in which leftover embryos - produced in vitro during a fertility treatment 
but not implanted in the maternal womb - or embryos specifically created for donation 
(using donor eggs and donor sperm) are provided to future parent(s); 
c) surrogacy, involving a woman (the surrogate) carrying the pregnancy for intended parents; 
in this case, a third donor’s oocyte is usually used to produce the embryo; more rarely the 
surrogate mother donates her ova. In few cases, the oocyte comes from the social mother, 
the woman who will take care of the resulting baby. 
 
Whenever half of, or the entire genetic makeup comes from donors, resulting children might 
nourish an interest in knowing certain data of their biological ascendants, in order to assess their 
genetic origins. In addition, in case of surrogacy, resulting children might be interested in knowing 
other relevant circumstances of their birth, even when they are not genetically related to the 
surrogate. As their existence would not have been possible without the surrogate’s contribution, 
some of her data might appear essential to them, to retrace their biographical origins. 
 
3. Genetic origins in the post-genomics era: new needs generated by new technologies 
 
Developments in medical science not only help to overcome barriers seemingly undefeatable, they 
also drive important changes in the society’s prevalent perceptions. As a matter of fact, while ART 
permit to ‘accord’ parenting to people who would not otherwise have a genetically related 
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offspring, the possibility to trace genetic identity through a DNA test, feeds an ‘in-built need to 
know the “truth”’ about personal roots10.  
 
A critical role in this regard has been played by the Human Genome Project, a publicly funded 
program initiated in 1990, with the objective of determining the DNA sequence of the entire 
euchromatic human genome, and declared complete in 200311. The consequences of this 
achievement are visibly enormous: the capacity to genetically predict personal risks of diseases 
and responsiveness to drugs, as well as the possibility to develop gene-based medicaments are 
having a revolutionary impact on the practice of medicine12, but also on personal expectations. 
Since a detailed analysis of the genetic makeup explains current pathological conditions and 
predicts likely future developments, knowing genetic origins implies a better treatment and a 
more likely successful prevention of diseases. As a consequence, people consider this information 
basilar to preserve health and, more in general, to enjoy a full psycho-physical wellbeing.  
 
Additionally, the entrance ‘into  the  new  genetic  era,  marked  by  the  Human  Genome  
Project’13 alimented the idea that biological origins are crucial to define identity and kinship ties: 
the meaning of tracing these origins is closely linked to the construction of the self, through a 
complete definition of the individual’s narrative identity14.  
 
Clearly this process is not free from potential deviations. In a society ‘obsessed with tracing its 
ancestors’15, ‘the gene has been seen as the “unifying concept” of the field of biology, with a 
virtually  “iconic  status”  that  makes  it  capable  of  explaining  us  to  ourselves’16 and DNA has 
become ‘a contemporary soul, the site of identity and self’17. As a consequence, ‘people tend to 
see genetic information as more definitive and predictive than other types of data’18. Such genetic 
determinism or essentialism19 generates ‘an un-warranted sense of inevitability’20 and may finally 
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cause the risk to perceive blood kinship as superior to adoptive relationships21, or push children 
‘to find their “parents”, not necessarily because of a “natural” desire to know their origins, but 
because such a desire is constructed, recognized, and legitimized by the law’22.  
 
However, even despite these questionable profiles, the assessment of certain scientific data is 
becoming an easy and fast process and seeking this kind of information is rapidly turning in a 
routine expectation for everyone.  
 
4. Surrogacy and biographic origins 
 
The key importance of genetic information for health and personal identity, however, does not 
exhaustively portray the contents of the right of ART-conceived people to know their origins. In 
this perspective, it is interesting to note that adoptees trying to trace their origins are usually 
more interested in finding the birth mother, rather than both the biological parents. As CAHAN 
explains, ‘genetics provides only a partial explanation for the search process’23.  
 
Therefore, even for ART-conceived people, the desire to assess personal origins may implies an 
additional dimension, covering other relevant circumstances of birth, with special reference to the 
role played by the surrogate mother. Depending upon personal attitude and experience, an 
individual might feel necessary (or at least desirable) to know the woman who has carried him or 
her in her womb, in order to better define the perception of the self, and the scope of his/her 
narrative identity. 
 
The European Court of human rights seems to confirm this conclusion in Gaskin v. Uk, stressing 
the existence of ‘a vital interest, protected by the Convention, in receiving the information 
necessary to know and to understand (…) childhood and early development’24. The case 
concerned the right of the applicant, who had been placed in public care as a baby, to have access 
to his complete personal file. The Court decided that people in the applicant’s position should not 
be obstructed from accessing their records confirming that ‘the information compiled and 
maintained by the local authority related to the applicant’s basic identity, and indeed provided the 
only coherent record of his early childhood and formative years’25. 
Mutatis mutandis, a similar principle is applicable in the case of surrogacy, especially considering 
that prenatal attachment26 to the gestational mother might be relevant for the definition of the 
individual identity. 
 
5. The right to know personal origins as a fundamental right to be balanced with other 
prominent positions 
 
Even in the absence of an autonomous formulation in international treaties, the right to know 
personal origins falls within the scope of several rights: the child’s right to know his/her parents 
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and to preserve identity, the right to a private life and to the protection of personal data and the 
right to health. None of them, however, has an absolute nature: a fair balance with other 
(collective and individual) interests relevant in each case is thus deemed necessary.  
Particular attention should be firstly paid to the position of donors and surrogate mothers, who 
may claim a right to anonymity. The right to remain unidentified is connected to the protection of 
their personal data, but it also aims at protecting their private and family life, whenever they want 
to preserve affective ties from external interference.  
As much important are the rights of social (and legal) parents, who usually wish to maintain the 
donors’ and surrogates’ anonymity, in order to better preserve the stability of their relationships 
with children27.  
Finally, natural siblings are in a controversial position. On the one hand, they (should) have an 
objective interest in knowing people sharing - at least in part - their genetic make-up, at any rate 
to avoid accidental incest. On the other hand, they might demand respect for their private life, 
including personal data. 
 
The analysis will proceed considering the right to know personal origins through the lens of the 
different international law provisions covering it. It will then move to envisage potential guidelines 
for a fair balance with the donors’ and/or surrogates’ right to anonymity, understood as a right to 
the respect of private life and personal data. The ECtHR case-law will offer some directions in this 
regard. While the Court has never decided a case on the right of ART-conceived people to know 
their origins, principles can be derived from the jurisprudence on the establishment of paternity 
and on the identification of the birthmother in case of anonymous and secret birth. In both classes 
of judgements, the Court affirms that people seeking to establish the identity of their ascendants 
have a vital interest in receiving the information necessary to establish an important aspect of 
their personal identity28, and that such interest does not decrease with age, quite the reverse29.  
 
5.1 A multifaceted right  
 
First of all, the right to know personal origins can be understood as a specification of the 
guarantee framed under Article 7 of the Convention on the rights of the child (Child Convention), 
according which any child shall have, ‘as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his 
or her parents’.   
This provision has to be broadly interpreted, in particular considering that the term ‘parents’ 
embraces genetic parents, birth parents30 and even ‘psychological parents’, namely ‘those who 
cared for the child for significant periods during infancy and childhood’31. However, the wording 
‘as far as possible’ suggests that the identity of a parent may be unknown for a number of 
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reasons32, including cases in which the State itself decides that a parent should not be identifiable 
(so-called ‘state-approved secrecy’)33. Thus, Article 7 ‘create[s] a presumption in favour of 
providing children with access to information about their biological parents before they turn 18 
where this is logistically possible, that is, if the information is available’34. Worthy of note, 
egg/sperm donation under anonymity (whenever prescribed or consented by domestic law) is a 
state-approved secrecy: nevertheless, the UN Committee on the rights of the child argued the 
possible contradiction between this policy and Article 735. 
 
The right to know one’s own origins is also linked to the right to preserve identity, guaranteed by  
Article 8 of the Child Convention. This provision contains the first legal recognition of identity as a 
fundamental right and, notably, at the benefit of children36. This notwithstanding, Article 8 does 
not provide a sound definition of identity, but it rather mentions three of the aspects that this 
concept includes (name, nationality and family relations), already enumerated under Article 7.  
Still, this is not an exhaustive list as ‘many other aspects of the child’s identity (…) are deemed 
protected by the provision, for example the child’s personal history, (…) race, culture, religion, 
language and (…) physical appearance, abilities and inclinations’37. As a matter of fact, ‘identity’ is 
a very broad concept covering all those elements that allow anyone to assert his/her existence in a 
society. Identity is a matter of recognition of everybody’s individuality, what differentiates any 
person from his/her peers. Thus, Article 8 includes ‘the right to know one’s ancestral background,  
including  medical and  genetic  information  about  oneself and one’s  biological  parentage,  the 
circumstances of one’s conception, time and place of birth, and records of other events 
meaningful  to the individual’38.  
 
Children, obviously, are not the only beneficiaries of the right to know the genetic and/or 
biographic origins. Rather, this right is more easily exercised in adulthood: therefore, other treaty 
provisions are relevant to assess it. The right to trace personal origins is connected to the right to 
the respect of private life, guaranteed by Article 8 of the European Convention of human rights 
(ECHR), as well as by Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU 
Charter), and by many other provisions, even under the different wording of ‘right to privacy’39. As 
clarified by the European Court of human rights, the right to the private life covers many different 
manifestations of a person’s existence, seen both as an expression of individuality and as a set of 
relationships with other people. It is clear that the access to information relating genetic and 
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biographic origins may significantly influence the harmonious development of each individual’s 
personality, conditioning the way of being of each one, as well as the establishment of 
connections with others. 
 
The right to know genetic and biographic origins can also be construed as part of the right to the 
protection of personal data, guaranteed under Article 8 ECHR and specified in other provisions, 
such as Article 8 of the EU Charter. This right implies a positive obligation upon States to ensure in 
favor of any individual the access to his/her data, held by public authorities or private persons.  
 
Last but not least, this right is closely related to the right to health, which is founded on a number 
of different legal provisions, both in universal40 and in regional instruments41. While being a 
dynamic concept, involving technical and legal different interpretations42, the right to health 
certainly includes the right to have access to relevant information including family medical history, 
which is particularly important in the case of hereditary diseases. This precise profile is explicitly 
recognized under Article 10 of the Oviedo Convention, stating that ‘everyone is entitled to know 
any information collected about his or her health’.  
 
5.2 Possible guidelines for balancing competing interests 
 
To identify guidelines for a fair balance between the rights to know genetic/biographic origins and 
other competing interests, it should be firstly considered whether the person interested in tracing 
his or her origins is a child or not. 
 
Whenever a minor (once became mature enough) claims to exercise the right to know his/her 
genetic/biographic origins, the principle of ‘the best interest of the child’ should be applied to 
solve potential clashes with competing interests. This principle, envisaged by Article 3 of the Child 
Convention, implies that the child’s best interest shall be a primary consideration in all actions 
concerning children, taken both by state authorities and by private institutions. The UN 
Committee on the rights of the child has clarified that it is a threefold concept, being at the same 
time a substantive right, an interpretative legal principle, and a rule of procedure43, while the 
ECtHR confirms that it is the guiding principle that drives its decision whenever a child’s position is 
considered44.  
 
Despite its undisputed relevance, ‘the definition of the child’s best interests, (…) is not always 
obvious, especially in a long-term perspective. (…) [I]t has been argued that what is in the best 
interests of the child varies from one era to another and also depends on the resources, the 
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developmental level and the culture of the country in which the child lives’45. In this sense, one 
might conclude that, in order to justify the disclosure of relevant data, the child’s interest should 
be specifically ‘qualified’. This would happen, for example, whenever special health reasons 
militate for a full tracing of the genetic origins.  
 
Nevertheless, in the most recent ECtHR’s case-law, the principle of ‘the best interest of the child’ 
seems to push the Court to identify not only a right, but even a ‘duty’ to know personal origins. 
This is what emerges from the case Mandet v. France 46 , in which the domestic courts 
acknowledged the right of a presumed biological father to have his paternity recognized, deciding 
that this was in the son’s best interests, despite the child (who already had a legal and social 
father) asked the judges not to change his established family ties. The child claimed a violation of 
Article 8 before the Court, which rather confirmed the domestic authorities’ decision, arguing - as 
underlined by MERCKX - that ‘the interests of the son simply did not lie where he saw them’47. 
According to the Strasbourg judges, domestic courts did not make the position of the biological 
father prevail over the child’s ones, but rather they correctly considered that the interests of both 
converged48.  
 
When the rights of an ART-conceived adult are at stake, on the contrary, it would firstly be 
necessary to draw a distinction between non-identifying and identifying data, as the precise 
contents of the information appears diriment. 
 
In fact, the disclosure of non-identifying data would easily satisfy the interest of the ART-
conceived person, while preserving the right to anonymity of other people involved. This is 
particularly relevant if one considers the right to health of the ART-conceived person. Despite de-
anonymization of gamete donors49 is usually the best way to guarantee access to genetic 
information - a key tool in the prevention and treatment of diseases - alternative solutions are 
certainly feasible50. In fact, ‘sperm banks have endeavored, and government regulation thereof 
should push, to make available to the parents of donor-conceived children the fullest possible 
medical histories’51. Thus, the right to health of ART conceived person can be satisfied without any 
interference in the rights of donors/surrogate, in particular without revealing their identity. The 
disclosure, in this case, should probably include the constant updated of the relevant records, 
possibly ‘contractually enforceable by banks against sperm donors’52, which appears an opportune 
and necessary operation in view of the constant scientific development in detecting diseases and 
producing medicaments. 
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52 Ibidem. 
Much more controversial would be the disclosure of the donor’s and/or the surrogate mother’s 
identity.  
 
A possible normative solution could be drawn from the ECtHR’s case-law on anonymous and 
secret birth. The decisions held in the cases Odièvre v. France and Godelli v. Italy demonstrate that 
the Court, in order to balance the right to anonymity of the birthmother and the right to trace 
origins of the progenies, requires an independent and impartial mechanism aimed at verifying, at 
the request of the interested person, the mother’s availability to waive anonymity53. It is up to the 
birthmother to decide whether (and to what extent) to renounce to confidentiality.  
 
It should be noted, nevertheless, that anonymous and secret birth is usually permitted to preserve 
not only the mother’s and child’s health during pregnancy and birth, but also to avoid abortions, 
abandonment other than under the proper procedure and even infanticide54. However, anonymity 
has clearly not the same meaning under ART normative discipline. Moreover, as BOTTIS well 
explains, ‘withholding a secret from someone represents the power over that person and a 
conflict of interest between two parties’55, especially when the information is kept reserved ‘“from 
the very person” [it] is directly related’56. If one considers that ‘the donor-conceived person 
[could] insist that the biological father’s/donor’s personal data are simultaneously ‘her’ data as 
well’57, the request to get information would not be described as the access to another individual’s 
personal data and would be consequently more easily satisfied. 
 
Nevertheless, ‘the rules pertaining to anonymity versus mandated identification are likely to be at 
the center of [the donor’s] evaluation in the majority of cases’58. For this reason, while a 
‘prospective’ regime, requiring for future donations/surrogacies the disclosure of all identifying 
information, would certainly not interfere with a surrogate/donor’s right to anonymity59, the 
legitimacy of the opening of past records (‘retrospective’ regime) is much more debated. A 
possible solution would be permitting retrospective access to identifying information, allowing the 
donors/surrogates to veto any potential contacts with the resulting children (so-called ‘contact 
veto system’60). However, according to TOBIN, ‘the compulsory release of identifying information 
against the will of a donor, even where a contact veto is in place and the donor conceived 
individual faced the threat of criminal sanction should this veto be breached, still remains 
problematic, [as it would] violate the guarantee of anonymity given to the donor in circumstances 
where it was a condition precedent to him making the donation in the first instance’61.  
Therefore, States are certainly called under international law to regulate the access to identifying 
information for future donations/surrogacies, but they should maintain the option of 
confidentiality for donors and surrogates who have been guaranteed anonymity, while 
encouraging them to disclose their identity. 
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6. The duty to tell the truth as a parents’ responsibility: what role for the State? 
 
The right to know genetic and biographic origins certainly implies the right to be informed about 
the modalities of the conception, namely the recourse to one of the mentioned third party 
reproduction techniques. We can define this profile as ‘the right to the truth’: it represents an 
essential prerequisite to the exercise of the right to know personal origins.  
 
In this field, children of heterosexual recipient parents are more exposed to a denial of their right 
than children of same-sex and single parents. In fact, secrecy surrounding the use of third-party 
ART is quite common among heterosexual couples and it is driven by the fear of possible negative 
impact on family bonds, especially between the parent who lacks a genetic link with the child and 
the child himself/herself62. On the contrary, different factors explain the reason why lesbian and 
gay parents are more used to reveal not only the recourse to gamete donation and surrogacy, but 
also the identity of the donor and the surrogate mother as well63. 
 
Does ‘the right to the truth’ imply a duty upon the States to ‘enforce’ the information? Clearly, if 
the answer were in the positive, a mechanism making information available to the resulting child 
only at his/her request, would not be sufficient for the State to fulfill its obligation. Rather, an 
‘active registry’ would be necessary: ‘a more muscular kind of intervention, which (…) would itself 
contact the child at age eighteen to let him or her know that he or she was donor conceived and 
allow (but not force) him or her to receive information about the donor’64.  
 
A similar solution, however, does not appear desirable, as it would probably create more problems 
than those it aims to address. Therefore, ‘the right to the truth’, as a conditio sine qua non for the 
exercise of the right to know the genetic and biographic origins, rests upon the parents who will 
freely decide whether to be honest with their children about the nature of their conception or not. 
In this field, States play only a residual role, being called to encourage recipient parents to reveal 
children the methods of conception, and to possibly supply counselling services to assist and guide 
all the people involved in the disclosure process. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
The respect of the right to know genetic and biographic origins requires rules imposing to donors 
and surrogates the disclosure (and, to some extent, the constant updating) of non-identifying 
data, including medical records, and even of identifying information, at least for donation and 
surrogacy to come. Donors’ and/or surrogates’ anonymity deserves a more stringent protection, 
when they have been guaranteed confidentiality, but States are arguably called to envisage 
mechanisms to encourage the release of information, as well as sustaining social parents and 
children in the process of disclosure the means of conception. 
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The recourse to ART is usually justified by the parents’ desire to have (at least partial) genetic 
connection with their progenies, as ‘a biological connection to the future’ is considered ‘a vital 
part of the identity of adults’65. Similarly, and even a fortiori, children might feel the analogous 
desire to define their ‘biological connectedness to the past’66, as well as other elements of their 
personal history, including pre-natal experiences, as in the case of surrogacy.  
States are thus called to guarantee that the use of technologies to create children and families is 
accompanied by clear normative provisions, fairly guaranteeing rights and interests of everybody. 
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